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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 18-3598 and 19-2178 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
          
v. 
 
RICHARD MURPHY,  
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-18-cr-00349-001) 
District Judge: Hon. John Michael Vazquez 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 24, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: December 4, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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This is a consolidated direct criminal appeal.  Defendant-Appellant Richard 
Murphy pled guilty to production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.                          
§ 2251(a).  In his first appeal, Murphy argues that his custodial sentence is both 
procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that he should have received a below 
Guidelines sentence.  In his second appeal, Murphy argues that the District Court’s order 
of restitution was unreasonable.  We will affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND 
 Murphy was charged with production of child pornography that involved abuse of 
his five-year-old stepdaughter.  After executing a search warrant, federal agents 
discovered that Murphy had a large collection of child pornography, including images 
and videos.  Murphy admitted that he had sexually abused his stepdaughter, had used his 
cell phone to record the abuse, and had distributed those images and videos to others.  
  Murphy pled guilty to one count of producing child pornography.  In his plea 
agreement, he agreed to pay restitution to the victims.  His advisory Guidelines range was 
262 to 327 months’ imprisonment, which reflected a total offense level of 39 and 
Criminal History Category I.  Murphy’s defense counsel did not object to the calculation, 
but he requested a variance to fifteen years’ imprisonment, the statutory mandatory 
minimum.  His counsel argued that the Guidelines that apply to child pornography 
offenses are too severe and that Murphy’s background should mitigate his punishment.  
In particular, his counsel highlighted his community contributions, his efforts to 
cooperate, and the sexual abuse he had experienced as a child.  He also noted that 
Murphy had not sought treatment in jail because he feared retribution.  The Government 
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opposed the variance request. 
 The District Court denied Murphy’s request.  After considering victim impact 
statements and Murphy’s mitigation arguments, as well as the severity of Murphy’s 
conduct, the District Court sentenced Murphy to 300 months’ imprisonment followed by 
15 years of supervised release.   
 Because the Government did not have all of the information needed to determine 
restitution by the time of the sentencing hearing, the District Court deferred its decision 
on restitution for ninety days.  The Government then submitted its restitution request for 
both Murphy’s production victim and his possession victims.  Murphy opposed any order 
of restitution because, he contended, he did not have any financial assets and had already 
been punished through his custodial sentence and term of supervised release.   
The District Court ordered Murphy to pay a total of $285,910 to the victims 
($170,910 to the production victim and $115,000 to the possession victims) and 
recommended that Murphy participate in the Bureau of Prison’s Inmate Financial 
Responsibility Program.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
We generally review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a district 
court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 119 
(3d Cir. 2014).  However, we review alleged procedural errors for plain error if the 
defendant failed to preserve the claim by objecting after the error occurred.  United States 
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v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  “We review de novo 
whether restitution is permitted by law and the amount of the award for abuse of 
discretion.”  United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 253 (3d Cir. 2011).  
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Reasonableness of Murphy’s Custodial Sentence 
Murphy argues that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable 
for four reasons: 1) the District Court failed to consider his mitigating circumstances 
arguments; 2) at the sentencing hearing the Government argued for a Guidelines sentence 
based on cases that it did not cite in its sentencing memorandum; 3) the Guidelines that 
apply to child pornography do not have any empirical basis; and 4) the Guidelines 
include enhancements that are inherent in the crime itself.  We review these claims for 
plain error because Murphy did not object after the alleged errors occurred at his 
sentencing hearing.  See Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 256.  
In reviewing whether a sentence is procedurally unreasonable, we consider 
whether the district court: 1) correctly calculated the Guidelines range; 2) ruled on any 
motions for departures; and 3) considered the § 3553(a) factors, including any requests 
for a variance.  See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010).  A 
sentence is only substantively unreasonable if “no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  “If 
the sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, we may presume that the sentence 
is reasonable.”  Handerhan, 739 F.3d at 119–20. 
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 Murphy’s arguments are unavailing.  The transcript of Murphy’s sentencing 
hearing reflects that the District Court calculated the Guidelines, weighed the § 3553(a) 
factors, and considered Murphy’s request for a variance.  The District Court fully 
considered all of Murphy’s mitigation arguments on the record.  Indeed, the District 
Court specifically noted that the mitigating factors bore on its decision not to sentence 
Murphy at the statutory maximum: “I know that the family justifiably asked for the 
maximum sentence, but I will give as to [sic] the mitigating factors consideration as to 
the appropriate sentence.”   SA57–58.  We do not find that the District Court’s “failure to 
give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they deserve renders the sentence 
unreasonable.”  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 Nor are we convinced by Murphy’s argument that the Government “ambushed” 
him by presenting new case law at the sentencing hearing.  18-3598 Appellant’s Br. 12.  
The Government’s sentencing memorandum included the cases that it cited at Murphy’s 
sentencing hearing; accordingly, Murphy’s counsel had full notice about these cases and 
should have been prepared to respond.   
 Under the circumstances of this case, we do not find Murphy’s argument that the 
child pornography guidelines do not have a sufficient empirical basis compelling.  The 
District Court was not required to disregard or disagree with the Guidelines.  See United 
States v. Lopez-Reyes, 589 F.3d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), “does not require a 
district court to reject a particular Guidelines range where that court does not, in fact, 
have disagreement with the Guideline at issue” and that a district court “is not required to 
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engage in independent analysis of the empirical justifications and deliberative 
undertakings that led  to a particular Guideline”)  (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Moreover, as the District Court discussed, the policy arguments that Murphy raises are 
applicable to possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography, not production.  
Nor do the cases on which Murphy relies involve production or U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1.  See 
United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010) (defendant was sentenced for 
transportation, receipt, and possession of child pornography under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1); 
United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (defendant was sentenced for 
distribution of child pornography under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2). 
 Murphy’s argument that his sentence was excessively harsh because the 
sentencing enhancements that he received would apply to anyone who violates 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(a) is similarly meritless.  Murphy disputes two of the sentencing enhancements.  
First, he challenges the enhancement that he received under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A)) 
because the offense involved the commission of a sexual act.  Second, he challenges the 
enhancement that he received under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) because he knowingly 
engaged in distribution.  He argues that both enhancements are “inherent” to violations of 
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) because they would apply to anyone who violates the statute.  18-
3598 Appellant’s Br. 23.   
We disagree.  Section 2251(a) does not specifically require commission of a 
sexual act between the victim and another person; rather, it requires “sexually explicit 
conduct.”  This may be a sexual act, but it may also be the “lascivious exhibition of the 
anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.”  18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v); see, e.g., United 
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States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that two photographs of a 
nude five-year-old girl met the definition of “lascivious exhibition” to support a violation 
of § 2251(a)).  Accordingly, it is possible to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) without 
engaging in the commission of a sexual act. 
Further, § 2251(a) does not require that the defendant personally distribute child 
pornography.  Rather, it requires that the defendant know or have reason to know that the 
depictions will be distributed or that the depictions have been produced or transmitted 
through interstate commerce.  Specifically, a defendant violates § 2251(a) if he: 
knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be 
transported or transmitted using any means or facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was 
produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, 
shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such 
visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted 
using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce 
or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).  Accordingly, a defendant may violate § 2251(a) without personally 
engaging in the distribution of child pornography.  
Although the District Court could have granted Murphy’s request for a variance, it 
was under no obligation to do so.  We do not fault this decision; the crime that Murphy 
committed was extremely serious and the District Court sentenced him within the 
Guidelines range.  As the District Court noted, “[t]here’s very few cases that are more 
serious behavior than involved in this one.”  We thus find no procedural or substantive 
error in the District Court’s sentencing.   
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B. The Reasonableness of Murphy’s Order of Restitution 
 Murphy also argues that he should not have been ordered to pay restitution 
because he does not have any financial resources and has already been punished through 
his custodial sentence and term of supervised release.1  Notably, before the District Court 
Murphy did not dispute any of the evidence or calculations that the District Court used to 
reach its restitution order; in fact, he specifically said that he “cannot go through each and 
every request.”  App. 200.  He only made an objection to the restitution order as a whole.   
 On appeal, however, Murphy raises additional challenges to the restitution order.  
He argues that: 1) he cannot pay because he does not have a job; 2) that one of the 
victim’s restitution requests did not have an empirical basis; and 3) that it will be harmful 
to his victims if he continues to make payments long into the future.   
We do not find any of these arguments convincing.  Murphy specifically agreed to 
pay restitution in his plea agreement.  Moreover, restitution is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2259: “The issuance of a restitution order under this section is mandatory.”  18 U.S.C. § 
2259(b)(4)(A).  In particular, “[a] court may not decline to issue an order under this 
section because of—(i) the economic circumstances of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C.       § 
2259(b)(4)(B)(i).  The court must order the defendant to pay “the full amount of the 
                                              
1 On this claim, there is some question as to whether Murphy timely appealed the District 
Court’s restitution order.  However, the Government has agreed to waive any objection 
based on timeliness so that we may decide Murphy’s claim on the merits.  We will do so.  
See Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that 
“[b]ecause Rule 4(b) is not grounded in statute . . . we are not deprived of appellate 
jurisdiction if a party fails to invoke the rule properly upon an untimely notice of 
appeal”).  
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victim’s losses,” including medical services, therapy, transportation, housing, and child 
care expenses, lost income, attorneys’ fees, and “any other relevant losses.” 18 U.S.C.      
§ 2259(b)(2)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(2).  Accordingly, Murphy’s argument that he 
should not be required to pay restitution because he does not have any money is 
unavailing.   
Since Murphy failed to challenge the District Court’s process for arriving at the 
restitution, we review for plain error.  Section 2259 requires the district court to award 
“the full amount of the victim’s losses suffered as a proximate result of the offense.”  
United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999).  The government must prove 
the amount of the victim’s loss by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 126.  A district 
court need not use precise empirical analysis to reach a restitution amount; as the 
Supreme Court has held, “[t]his cannot be a precise mathematical inquiry and involves 
the use of discretion and sound judgment.”  Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 459 
(2014).   
Murphy argues that the District Court should not have relied on the restitution 
request submitted by the family of his production victim because it did not have any 
empirical basis.  According to the Government, the family requested more than a million 
dollars for present and future therapy needs and lost wages even though they did not have 
the assistance of a forensic psychiatrist or legal counsel to reach this number.  But the 
record belies Murphy’s assertion that the District Court “embrace[d] this fictitious 
number.”  19-2178 Appellant’s Br. 8.  The Government provided sufficient evidence to 
“demonstrate[] the amount of the loss sustained” as a result of Murphy’s conduct, 
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including a letter from the victim’s therapist and her mother’s employer.  18 U.S.C. § 
3664(e).  Murphy has not disputed these letters or offered any other evidence.  The 
District Court reached its restitution order based specifically on the evidence of the 
victim’s loss: instead of more than a million dollars, the District Court awarded the 
production victim $170,910.   
Finally, there is no basis whatsoever in the case law or statutes for Murphy’s 
argument that restitution will harm his victims.  We see no error in the District Court’s 
restitution award.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm.   
